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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

)
)

Plaintiff and)
Respondent,
)
)
)

vs.

Case No. 16412

)

KEITH WILBERT MURPHY,

)
)

Defendant and)
Appellant.
)

**********************
APPELLANTS' BRIEF ON APPEAL

**********************
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Appellant, Keith Wilbert Murphy, was accused of having conunitted the crime of Receiving Stolen Property when
he was found sleeping in a motor vehicle on Nov. 22, 1978.
The case was tried in the District Court of Iron Co-

unty, State of Utah before the Honorable Robert F. OWens,
Judge pro tern, sitting with a jury.
A verdict was returned by the jury, finding appellant,
Keith Wilbert Murphy, guilty of having committed the crime
of Receiving Stolen Property.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Keith Wilbert Murphy, appellant, was sentenced an
Committed to the Utah State Prison to serve a term of not
less than one

(1) year nor more than fifteen

(15) years
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-by the Honorable Robert F. Owens, Judge pro tern, and
appellant has undertaken this appeal to the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant, Keith Wilbert Murphy, seeks a revesal of
the judgment entered by the court and have the District
Court ordered to enter a judgment of not guilty notwithstanding the jury verdict or a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
NOTE:

The court record, herein R- , includes
the trial transcripts.
Page 19, of the
record, R-19, consists of 69 sub-pages.
Page 20 of the record, R-20 1 consists
of 22 sub-pages.
All sub-pages will be referred to as
R-19and R-20-

Detective Houchen, a Cedar City Police officer, (R19-13) while looking for a van supposedly to have been
stolen (R-19-17) saw appellant on Nov. 22, 1978, near the
southeast corner of 400 North and 800 West in Cedar City
(R-19-14).

At that time the appellant was in the back of

a brown dodge van (R-19-14) at the rear of some apartments
on 400 North 800 West (R-19-15).

The appellant appeared

to the officer to be asleep on his back in the van (R-19·
15) •

The van was mostly empty except for the appellant.

a small ma tress, some beer and a couple of cassette tapes
(R-19-15).
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Detective Houchen arrested the appellant and advised
him of his miranda right.

(R-19-19).

The appellant, when questioned stated that a friend
by the name of Mike l.et him sleep in the van

During trial it was stipulated:

(R-19-21).

that if Rick Rose,

an employee of U & S Motor Company, _Cedar City, Utah, were

called he would testify the van was missing from U & S Motor
company parking lot just north ·of the JB.1-s Big Boy Restrauant
in Cedar City on or about November 19, 1978 (R-19-32).
Before trial, defense counsel stipulated that a
foundation would not have to be laid for certain documents
which relating to the van in order to show exactly which
vehicle the appellant had been found in (R-20-3) .

Said

documents included Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 and 2 (R-19-33).
Lori Pledger, appellants girlfriend, testified that
she knew the appellant (R-19-17) , that she said he was
driving "his van"

(R-19-51) , two days before the appellant

was arrested (R-19-49), and that the appellant drove her
home (R-19-51, R-19-54).
The state then rested (R-19-56) with no testimony at
all regarding any right of ownership or possession of the
van (R-19-56).
A motion to dismiss was made by defense counsel claim-
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ing that the State had failed to sustain the elements in the
information. (R-19-56).
Counsel pointed out that there was no evidence or
testimony at all showing that the van belonged to
Motor Company.

u

&

s

(R-19-56)

The court itself asked the State to comment on the
fact that the information stated that the van belonged to

u

&

S Motor Company and that the proof showed it belonged

to Robertsons

(R-19-59).

The court, without any request from the prosecution,
asked the prosecutor if he was going to amend the information to conform with the evidence (R-19-59).
Mr. Shumate moved to amend the information to "strike
U & S Motor Company and amend to Robert and Raina Robertson"

(R-19-59).
Defense counsel objected and pointed out to the court

that "all the evidence shows is that the appellant was
driving this van around on the case in chief" (R-19-59,60).
The court asked if the appellant would be prejudiced
by the amendment and defense counsel answered yes (R-1960) and pointed out the fact that when the appellant was
arrested, the van was parked next to the registered owners
address at 400 West 800 North

(R-19-60) , see Plaintiffs

Exhibit No. 1, and that counse 1 was in a good position to

-4-
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not put on any evidence and argue the matter to the jury
without putting on the appellant (R-19-61).
The state argued that it didn't have to show who
owned the van, just that it was stolen (R-19-58) no testimony was given by the States witness that the van was stolen.
The court allowed the state to _-reopen to amend the
information to "strike U

·&

S Motor Company and amend to

Robert and Raina Robertson (R-19-61).
At time of trial, the state had in its possession a
bill of sale showing that U & S Motor Company owned said
van (R-20-4,5).

See Defendant's Exhibit No.l (R-18).

Said bill of sale shows. that the Robertsons had sold
all interest in said van July 29, 1978, several months
before-the complaint was filed (R-1).
The appellant had been bond over in a preliminary
hearing in which ownership by U & S Motor Company was
claimed ( R- 2) .
The State went to trial with the intention of proving ownership of the van by U

&

S Motor Company (R-20-6).

The State did not inform the court that U & S Motor
Company actually owned the van and that Robertsons had no
interest in it when the State made its motion to amend the
information to show that the Robertsons owned said van.
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Following the amendment to the information, the defendant testified on his behalf and was convicted of the
charge as set forth in the information.

ARGUMENT
POINT I .
THE COURT'S ACTIONS BY DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS AND SUGGESTING TO THE PROSECUTION TO AMEND
THE INFORMATION BASED UPON THE ARGUMENT OF DEFENSE COUNSEL PLACED THE APPELLANT IN THE POSITION OF HAVING THREE
PROSECUTORS: THE STATE, THE COURT, AND HIS OWN DEFENSE
COUNSEL, AND THEREFORE DENIED APPELLANT THE RIGHT TO
EFFECTIVE COUNSEL.
The record clearly shows that the state had failed
to establish a prima facie cause of action in its case in
chief in that there was no testimony at all to show that
anyone had possessory right of the van except the appellant himself, or that the van was stolen or believed to
be stolen by the appellant.
When appellant's counsel moved to dismiss against
the appellant for failure to establish a prima facie case,
the court should have granted said motion.

Instead, the

court recognized the "variance between the proof and infor· ·
mation"

(R-19-58,59) when i t stated:
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"The information states the vehicle
belonged to U & S Motor. Company.
The proof shows it belongs to Robertson" (R-19-59)
and then the court without ruling on appellant's motion
asked the prosecutor., Mr. Shumate, "Are you going to
move to amend the information to conform with the evidence,
Mr.

Shumate"

(R-19-59).

Thus appellant's counsel by making his motion £or_
judicial expediency, in fact, became a prosecutor helping
the State by exposing the failure of the State to put on
a prima facie case.

Had appellant's counsel also rested

he could then have argued to the jury the ridiculous variance between the information and the proof and waste9
valuable court time •.
Appellant had a right to be represented by effective ...
counsel during trial.
U.S. 790

(1970)

Parker vs. North Carolina, 397

How can counsel be effective when

information in an appropriate motion to dismiss is used as
an incentive by the prosecution to move to amend and the
court allows such motion before acting on said motion to
dismiss.

~7~
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POINT II.
APPELLANT WAS NOT ALLOWED REASONABLE TIME TO MEET THE
NEW MATTER SET UP IN THE A.MENDED INFORMATION AND THE APPELLANT WAS NOT FAIRLY TREATED BY THE PROSECUTION.

When an amendment of an information is allowed during
trial the

court is required under Section 77-17-3, Utah

Code Annotated, 1953 as amended to give a defendant reasonable time to meet the new matter.
When the court, on its own initiative asked the state
prosecutor if he wanted to amend the information after the
state had rested, the appellant objected and explained how
he would be prejudiced if the amendment were made (R-1960 ,61).

The record shows that from the beginning, by the
complaint and by the preliminary hearing, the State alleged ownership of the van by U
R-2).

&

S Motor Company (R-1,

Not until the state rested and i t was pointed out

in appellant's motion that the state never put on any
proof of ownership by u

&

s Motor Company did the state

try something very strange, to wit:

ask the court to

amend the information to show new owners of the alleged
stolen van when the state prosecutor had every reason to
believe that U & S Motor Company still owned said van
( R-2 0-4, 5 , 6) •
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1

Appellant received for the first time on March.15,

1979, a copy of an automobile bill of sale purporting to
show that U & S Motor Company had purchased said van from
the Robertsons months before the complaint was filed.
Said copy of bill of sale was provided by the state and
represented to be a true and correct copy of the original
(R-20-5)

to which the state agreed.

The above information and copy of bill of sale, appellant Exhibit No. 1 was presented to the court before
sentencing (R-20) when the appellant objected to sentencing
being held (R-20-2) , and renewed his motion to dismiss
notwithstanding the jury verdict.
The prosecutor for the State admitted that he had come
to trial with the intention of showing ownership of the
van by

·u & S Motor Company

(R-20-6).

Had more time been allowed to meet the amended information, appellant could have been able to obtain the orginal bill of sale and witnesses to show that the Robert-.
sons did not have any interest in the van as shown by said
bill of sale.
Had the prosecutor informed the court, at the time of
his motion to amend, that he had a bill of sale showing
showing that the Robertsons had no interest in the van,
surely, the court would not have allowed the amendment.
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1\ I;>.rm;ecutor is under an obligation to treat the defendant
fairly and he cannot wilfully surpress evidence favorable
to the

appellant for purposes of obtaining a conviction

State v. Adams, 583 P.2d 89

(Utah 1978).

The prosecutor

breached his obligation to tell the court that the Robertsons had no interest in the van when he made his motion
to amend.
POINT III
APPELLANT WAS ENTITLED TO A DIRECTED VERDICT OF ACQUITTAL AT CLOSE OF STATES CASE BEFORE THE INFORMATION WAS
AMENDED
The state has a burden of proving each and every element of the offense and if i t fails to do so the defendant
is entitled to an acquittel.
P.2d 139

State v. Housekeeper, 588

(Utah 1978).

No evidence during the States case in chief was ever
introduced to show that the alleged stolen van was ever
in fact stolen.

No one testified, that the van was stolen

or that the appellant believed the van to be stolen.
A critical element of the crime of theft by receiving
stolen property is that the accused knows or believes that
property probably has been stolen.

Section 76-6-408,

Receiving Stolen Property, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as
amended.
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The general rule is that on the trial of a criminal
prosecution the court may take'the case from the jury for
want of sufficient proof to establish the guilt of the
accused. 75 Arn Jur 2d, TRIAL, Section 436, p.467.
Therefore, when the state rested the first time,
evidence of the elements of the alleged crime were missing
so that no question .for the jury was involved and the court
had a duty to withdraw the

case~from_the

jury.

It is the duty of the court to take the
case from the jury where no question for
the jury is involved.
To continue such
a contest before a jury is subversive of
the public interests, is promotive of no
right of either party and may be pernicious as to deny to a citizen his right
to trial by jury.
75 Arn Jur 2d, TRIAL,
Section 431, page 465.
The court should have granted appellant's motion
to dismiss and a directed. verdict of not guilty.

POINT IV
THE APPELLANT

WAS ENTITLED TO.HAVE HIS _MOTION FOR

NEW TR;I;AL GRANTED AND THE COURTS DENIAL WAS PREJUDICAL

ERROR.
Appellant made a motion for a new trial (R-20-11)
before sentencing based upon the fact that the State's
prosecutor, Mr.· Shumate, did not in£orrn the court that the
Robertsons had not owned the van for months prior to the·
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time the appellant was found sleeping in it.
The court denied the motion (R-19-12)

and appellants

counsel made an offer of proof for the record as follows:
THE COURT:

You may state an offer

of proof for the record, at this time.
MR. BOUTWELL:

Okay.

I would

expect that if Mr. Shumate was called to the stand and
sworn that he would testify that he is the County Attorney
of Iron_County, duly elected.

That in the case of the

State of Utah versus Keith Wilburt Murphy, Criminal No.
what is the number, your Honor?
THE COURT:

Number 681.

MR BOUTWELL:

-- number 681, that

when this case came to trial, after being duly noticed on
February 15th, that the State had every intention to proceed to show that this vehicle had been stolen or taken fro;,
the possession of the US Motor Company and_to show-that
US Motor Company was the legal owner.

That, in fact,

the State had in its possession during the trial an original bill of sale from US Motor Company -- excuse me,
strike that -- from the Robertsons to US Motor company.
That the State was unable to prove that evidence and there·
f ore

al. d

not prove t h at t h e US Motor Company was the valid

..,12-

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

owner because the State had not and had failed to bring
forward the witnesses to show this transaction had occurred.
And that the State had every reason to believe that it had
occurred and that the US Motor Company was the only person
who had any interest in that vehicle.

That following the

end of the trial and the defendant's motion to dismiss because the State had failed to show that anyone but the defendant had possession of that vehicle, that the State moved
to reopen and amend the complaint to show that the Robertsons were the legal owners when in fact the State believed
that it was the US Motor Company who owned this car.

And

that the State failed to inform the Court of its belief and
of its possession of this bill of sale.

And that is what

I would expect to prove if we called Mr. Shumate to the
stand.
THE COURT:

The record may show

your proffer.
The record also shows that the court refused to let
appellant make a proffer by calling the prosecutor, Mr.
Shumate, to the stand, and instead instructed the appellant to make a verbal proffer (R-20-13).
If there is reasonable likelihood that in absence
of error, there would have been a different result, error
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should be regarded as prejudicial.
P. 2d 466

State v. Howard, 54 4

(Utah 1978).

If the court had not allowed the information to be
amended, there certainly would have been a reasonable
likelihood that the trial would have ended with a different
result.

First, there had been no evidence presented at tria:

that U & S Motor Company

had any interest in the van,

Second, the defendant would not of had to testify, Third,
the address on the title documents in evidence and the
location where the appellant was found sleeping was the
same 400 West 800 North, Cedar City, Utah.

Fourth, no

evidence had been presented that the appellant did not
have a possessory right to the van,

Fifth, the appellant

argument to the jury would have shown the above with a
predictably favorable result.
The court was fully appraised that in all likelihood
that the information stated an impossibility and it was
prejudicial error not to allow a new trial.
CONCLUSION
Because the appellant was not fairly treated by the
State prosecutor at trial and the court failed to correct
the injustice the District Court should be ordered to
enter a judgment of not guilty notwithstanding the jury
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verdict or in the alternative order that the appellant
be given a new trial.

Respectfully submitted,

RONALD BRENT BOUTWELL
P.O. Box 857
Hurricane, Utah 84737
Telephone: 635-4671
Attorney for Appellant
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